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Approaches of data analysis in the context of Business Intelligence solutions are presented, 
when the data is scarce with respect to the needs of performing an analysis. Several scenarios 
are presented: usage of an initial dataset obtained from primary data as a reference for the 
quality of the results, enriching the dataset through decoration with derived attributes and en-
riching the dataset with external data. Each type of dataset decoration is used to improve the 
quality of the analysis’ results. After being subject to improvement using the presented meth-
ods, the improved dataset contains a large number of attributes regarding a subject. As some 
attributes  refer  to  sensitive  information  or  imply  sensitive  information  about  the  subject, 
therefore dataset storage needs to prevent unwanted analysis that could reveal such infor-
mation. A method for dataset partitioning is presented with respect to the predictive capacity 
of a set of attributes over a sensitive attribute. The proposed partitioning includes also means 
to hide the link between the real subject and stored data.    
Keywords: Business Intelligence, Data Mining, Security, Privacy, Dataset Partitioning, Se-
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Introduction 
Business Intelligence (BI) helps the de-
cision  making  process.  It  relies  on  various 
data to offer reports, estimations and support 
[1].  At the base of BI, there are mechanisms 
for data processing. The results of data anal-
ysis are highly dependent on the hypothesis 
made for the analysis, the quality of the data, 
the algorithms used for processing. There are 
areas where for a proper analysis, available 
data is not sufficient or there is room for im-
provement. Such cases are discussed in the 
following.  Presented  methods  improve  the 
results of analysis. Some derived information 
is sensitive. We take into account that unau-
thorized  access  to  the  dataset  could  trigger 
the case when analysis may disclose sensitive 
information about the subject represented by 
a  certain  instance  in  the  dataset.  Security 
must be assessed and a solution is needed to 
cover this risk. 
 
2 Problem Formulation of Security Issues 
Generated by Improved Prediction Using 
Enlarged Datasets  
Various  situations  arise  when  BI  tries  to 
solve difficult problems that heavily impact 
the organization. In telecom industry, efforts 
are made to predict and to prevent existing 
customers  to  migrate  to  another  operator 
from the market. In the electronic commerce, 
efforts are made to predict what clients need 
and to send them incentives, offers and bo-
nuses.  In  stock  markets  and  currency  mar-
kets, predictions are made to estimate quotes 
and exchange rates.  
Business intelligence has its power based on 
several aspects: 
  the available data used to derive useful 
information for the business; 
  the  instruments  used  to  process  the 
available data; 
  the  instruments  used  to  present  the  re-
sults to the decision maker. 
The available data are mainly taken from the 
records  made by the organization, from  in-
ternal  documents  such  as  contracts,  orders, 
invoices etc., activity history. The available 
data  depends  on  the  degree  of  how  much 
electronic support is used over manual opera-
tions. Ideally, data is stored in files in data-
bases and readily available when needed. 
The instruments used to process data are used 
to: 
  transform primary data according to var-
ious needs; 
  apply  algorithms  in  order  to  obtain  re-
sults. 
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The power of such instruments is given by 
the flexibility in accessing heterogeneous da-
ta and the quality and variety of algorithms 
used to obtain results. 
The instruments used to present the results to 
the decision maker have to hide the complex 
processing from the previous type of instru-
ments  and  show  useful  information  in  a 
handful way. Reports have to be easy to un-
derstand and conclusions must be highlighted 
in order to bring business value to the organ-
ization. 
A common case is when a certain variable Y 
is studied. Variable Y is under the influence 
of various factors having associated the cor-
responding  X1,  X2,  ...,  Xn  variables.  For 
these, data series are built and various algo-
rithms may be applied to obtain results. For 
example, this pattern applies well to regres-
sion or classification problems used to solve 
problems like churn prediction, suggestion of 
similar products, exchange rate forecasts. 
Taking  into  account  this  problem  formula-
tion, at organization level, several cases arise 
with respect to the available data for solving 
the problem.  
A particularity of some organizations is the 
fact that available data are restricted to inter-
nal sources. An example would be a mobile 
network operator having prepaid subscribers. 
The  mobile  operator  does  not  have  any 
knowledge regarding the subscriber identity, 
personal  information  other  than  the  service 
usage the subscriber does, which is recorded. 
If the service provider wants to address the 
churn prediction problem then it is limited to 
the information that can be withdrawn from 
the call detail records. 
In this case, from the primary data which is 
represented by the call detail records, through 
querying, data series may be obtained for the 
X1, X2... Xn variables or attributes. Estima-
tions are made, and results are obtained re-
garding either the estimation of variable Y, in 
case of regression analysis, or the classifica-
tion  of  instances,  if  classification  is  em-
ployed. Using a quality indicator for the re-
sults a quantitative value Q1 shows how well 
the used algorithm performs on the respec-
tive dataset. 
In the same context of data restricted to in-
ternal  sources,  an  improvement  over  the 
quality of the result consists of improving the 
dataset by decoration. Transformation of the 
dataset containing the data series for attrib-
utes  X1,  X2,  ...,  Xn,  obtained  from  primary 
data, is done through various methods: 
  applying  simple operations  between at-
tributes, based on the principles of build-
ing statistical indicators [2], obtaining a 
new subset of attributes U1, U2, ..., Um; 
this is a convenient way as the newly de-
rived  attributes  have  actual  statistical 
meaning which makes them easy to in-
terpret  and  use;  it  was  shown  that  the 
quality of the result Q2 improved over 
the use of the initial dataset when using a 
decorated dataset, even if the source is 
the same; 
  a more general approach is obtained by 
generating  new  attributes  through  gene 
expression  programming;  a  new  subset 
U1,U2,.. Um is added to the existing da-
taset;  an  algorithm  is  run  and  a  new 
quantitative result Q2 is obtained; the re-
sult  is  better  than  the  result  obtained 
from the estimation of the initial dataset, 
without  any  decoration,  as  Q2>Q1.  In 
[3] are presented information about the 
gene expression programming. 
A  solution  to  the  problem  of  estimating  a 
variable or classifying an instance when little 
data is available is to extend the existing da-
taset with data series corresponding to exter-
nal  information.  The  improved  dataset  X1, 
X2, ..,Xn, U1, U2, ..Um is extended with exter-
nal data that is transformed and a new subset 
V1, V2, .., Vp is added to the initial dataset. 
On  this  improved  dataset,  estimations  are 
made and a new result is obtained, having a 
corresponding quality Q3. Ideally, Q3 is better 
than  Q2  or  Q1  if  the  external  information 
brought  into  the  dataset  is  relevant  for  the 
problem, e.g. if the external data series is as-
sociated to a factor that influence variable Y, 
in case of regression analysis or is relevant 
attribute  for  classification.  Ideally,  the  fol-
lowing  relation  must  be  accomplished: 
Q3>Q2>Q1. Figure 1 depicts the three stages 
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Fig. 1. Available data and means of result quality improvement 
 
Each organization establishes the objectives.  
To reach the objectives, some decisions are 
made based on results given by the Business 
Intelligence  solutions  at  organization  level. 
In order to obtain the results, data has to be 
available  to  be  processed  by  various  algo-
rithms.  This  way,  the  necessary  data  is  as-
sessed and design processes are executed to 
establish how to obtain the necessary data. 
The  result  of  employing  presented  dataset 
improvement  has  several  consequences  re-
garding the studied subjects: 
  a relatively large number attributes is de-
rived regarding the studied subject 
  as  the  quality  of  the  classification  im-
proves  based on the existing  attributes, 
extra attributes may be derived regarding 
the  studied  subject  due  to  correlations 
between attributes; in [9] the author of 
the thesis demonstrates the possibility of 
deriving private attributes due to statisti-
cal  relationship  with  public  attributes. 
Therefore, if we take into account con-
crete cases, there exists the capacity of 
deriving  private  information  about  the 
customers just analyzing publicly avail-
able information by applying regression 
or classification algorithms. 
Taking into account these peculiarities, a new 
problem  arise  regarding  how  derived  data 
should be stored by the Business Intelligence 
storage engine in order to prevent an attacker 
to: 
  link  existing  derived  attributes  with  a 
certain person’s identity 
  estimate private information about a per-
son  based  on  the  attribute  information 
stored in the underlying data storage at 
the base of the Business Intelligence. 
 
3 Solutions for Addressing Security Issues 
The  proposed  solution  to  avoid  estimating 
private attributes of a customer using existing 
records takes into account data partitioning. 
Approaches to dataset partitioning are found 
in [6] and [7]. For the problem of partitioning 
we consider the set of known attributes A1, 
A2, …, An. In order to protect a single private 
attribute Aj from being estimated by an at-
tacker,  the  subset  of  known  attributes  that 
contribute to the correct estimation of Aj has 
to be determined. Also, attribute Aj may also 
indicate a public attribute but from another 
partition, such way gaining access to a parti-
tion, the attacker can’t reconstruct the whole 
dataset. Considering that correlations or de-
pendencies  between  attributes  Ai1,  Ai2,  …, 
Aik  make  estimation  of  Aj  possible  with  a 
good fitness the aim is to segment these at-
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certain  partition  to  contain  estimator  attrib-
utes that are unable to estimate Aj with rele-
vant  precision.  Therefore,  if  an  attacker  is 
able to gain access to a partition, it is unable 
to  use  attribute  data  found  to  estimate  the 
protected attribute. 
The  steps  for  implementing  this  approach 
are: 
1.  depending  on  the  application’s  objec-
tives and available data, the solution ana-
lysts  identify  which  sensitive  attributes 
that are likely to be estimated based on 
the  available  data  should  be  protected. 
Also  dependency between all attributes 
from the dataset has to be determined in 
case partitions have to be independent. 
2.  the list of dependency attributes Ai1, Ai2, 
…, Aik that can be used to derive attribute 
Aj is obtained from the initial list A1, A2, 
…, An by applying an attribute selection 
algorithm  that  takes  into  account  indi-
vidual  predictive  ability,  correlation  or 
information  gain  in  relation  with  the 
studied attribute Aj. 
3.  at dataset level, a dependency matrix is 
created  as  presented  in 
4.    5.  Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Dependency matrix between attributes 
  A1  A2  …  Aj  …  An  Ap1  Ap2  …  Apm 
A1  D1,1  D1,2  …  D1,j  …  D1,n  D1,p1  D1,p2  …  D1,pm 
A2  D2,1  D2,2  …  D2,j  …  D2,n  D2,p1  D2,p2  …  D2,pm 
…                     
Ai  Di,1  Di,2  …  Di,j  …  Di,n  Di,p1  Di,p2    Di,pm 
…                     
An  Dn,1  Dn,2  …  Dn,j  …  Dn,n  Dn,p1  Dn,p2    Dn,pm 
Ap1  Dp1,1  Dp1,2  …  Dp1,j  …  Dp1,n  Dp1,p1  Dp1,p2    Dp1,pm 
Ap2  Dp2,1  Dp2,2  …  Dp2,j  …  Dp2,n  Dp2,p1  Dp2,p2    Dp2,pm 
                     
Api  Dpi,1  Dpi,2  …  Dpi,j  …  Dpi,n  Dpi,p1  Dpi,p2  …  Dpi,pm 
                     
Apm  Dpm,1  Dpm,2  …  Dpm,j  …  Dpm,n  Dpm,p1  Dpm,p2    Dpm,pm 
 
In 
 
Table 1 the dependency matrix between a t-
tributes is presented and the elements signify 
as follows: 
A1, …, An – available attributes in the dataset 
that is to be partitioned. 
Ap1, …, Apm – private attributes supposedly 
being estimated using A1, …, An set. Ap1, …, 
Apm are stored externally of the BI system, 
but are likely to be estimated using data from 
the BI system. 
Di,j – dependency between attributes Ai and 
Aj from the same dataset; the value of Di,j is 
one if the attribute selection algorithm chose 
Aj as   influential  or correlated with  Ai;  Aj 
can be used to estimate Ai; 
Dpi,j – dependency showing Aj’s influence or 
correlation with external and private attribute 
Api; 
In  submatrix  [Dp1,p1,  Dpm,pm]  dependencies 
are considered zero as dependency between 
external attributes is not in the scope of our 
system.  
6.  the following elements are taken into ac-
count the following: 
  consider NP the number of partitions 
to  be  created  as  an  input,  the  parti-
tions are the disjoint subsets Pi, with 
the property that P1 U P2 U … U PNP 
= { A1, …, An }; 
  consider the attribute that needs to be 
protected  from  being  estimated  un-
willingly, the secret attribute As, and 
the indicator IQE(As, Pi) representing 
the quality of the estimation of the se-
cret  attribute  As  using  the  attribute 
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7.  the best partitioning with respect to the 
protection of a single attribute As is P1, 
P2,  …,  PNP  with  the  property  that 
IQE(As, Pi) < ε, for all i=1,NP, where ε 
is an acceptance threshold and As does 
not belong to Pi; 
8.  in case more than one  attribute is  pro-
tected the set of secret attributes is As1, 
As2, …, Ask, then the partitioning P1, 
P2, …, PNP has to respect the property 
IQE(Asj,  Pi)  <  ε,  for  all  i=1,NP  j=1,k 
and Asj does not belong to Pi. 
In  order  to  perform  the  actual  partitioning, 
convenient  number  of  partitions  has  to  be 
chosen  along  with  an  appropriate  indicator 
for the quality of the estimations. 
For  example,  consider  the  simple  case  in 
which  a  single  attribute  is  protected,  the 
number of partitions is NP=2 and the indica-
tor for the quality of estimations takes into 
account that the quality is proportional with 
the number of factors taken into account. In 
this case the partitioning will involve an heu-
ristic algorithm, assuming influence over As 
is equally distributed among the factor attrib-
utes: 
  determining  the  k  attributes  in  the  de-
pendency list  Ai1, Ai2, …, Aik; 
  creating a partition P1 containing half of 
the attributes in the dependency list Ai1, 
Ai2, …, Aik/2 and half of the rest of the 
attributes in the initial attribute list; 
  creating  a  partition  P2  containing  the 
second half of the  attributes  in  the de-
pendency list Ai(k/2)+1,…, Aik and the 
second half of the rest of the attributes in 
the initial attribute list. 
The more general case involves many attrib-
utes, and many partitions available for stor-
age.  The  number  of  possible  combinations, 
the complexity of the evaluations makes dif-
ficult applying an exhaustive search method. 
Therefore we propose a genetic approach for 
the partitioning problem. The initial setup for 
the genetic approach is to map key concepts 
from the problem to be solved to key con-
cepts from the evolutionary algorithm. 
First of all, the solution that is searched is an 
allocation of attributes A1, A2, …, An to par-
titions P1, P2, …, PNP such way the estima-
tion capability for the protected attributes us-
ing a certain partition Pi is minimized. There-
fore  we  consider  an  initial  population  of 
chromosomes  that  encode  the  allocation  of 
attributes to partitions. In Table 2 the struc-
ture of a chromosome is presented. 
Table 2. Structure of a chromosome used for 
genetic partitioning 
G1  G2  …  Gi  …  GNP 
PA1  PA2  …  PAi  …  PANP 
 
The structure of the chromosome as present-
ed in Table 2 contains a number of NP genes, 
G1, G2, …, GNP, where Gi encodes the parti-
tion attribute Ai is allocated to, given by the 
value PAi that takes one of the values {1, 2,.., 
NP}.  An  example  of  partitioning  chromo-
some with five attributes and two partitions is 
presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Sample partitioning generated by 
chromosome encoding of length 5 
G1  G2  G3  G4  G5 
2  1  1  2  1 
 
The  chromosome  depicted  in  Table  3  en-
codes the following partitioning: for a set of 
five attributes, needed to be split into two 
partitions, the first partition contains attri b-
utes P1={A2, A3, A5}, while the second parti-
tion is P2={A1, A4}. 
In order to enable comparability of the solu-
tions encoded by various chromosomes, each 
chromosome that encodes a partitioning solu-
tion is evaluated using an aggregated indica-
tor built on top of the indicator used to assess 
the quality of estimation. For example, if the 
IQE  is  additive, then a chromosome evalua-
tion function E is: 
 
E(chromosome) = Sum IQE(As,Pi), i=1,NP 
 
where  
chromosome – the chromosome that is eval-
uated; 
IQE(As,Pi) – the indicator showing the quality 
of the estimation of protected attribute As us-
ing attributes from Pi partition; 
Pi  –  partition  obtained  selecting  attributes 
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PAi=i.  
Taking into account that we aim to limit es-
timation capacity for each partition, therefore 
the evaluation function is to be minimized. 
An initial population of randomly generated 
chromosomes is evolved by applying genetic 
operators such as: 
  selection  –  based  on  the  value  of  the 
evaluation function, a proportion of the 
best chromosomes are retained to move 
to  the  next  generation  –  i.e.  chromo-
somes with low values of the evaluation 
function; 
  cross-over  –  between  randomly  chosen 
chromosomes  from  the  new  generation 
genetic material is exchanged at random 
gene position; new chromosomes are ob-
tained; 
  mutation  –  randomly  chosen  chromo-
somes may have some values changed in 
order to introduce variability.  
In Table 4 two chromosomes are presented in 
the state before cross-over. After cross-over 
at  the  position  of  gene  G3,  the  resulting 
chromosomes are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 4. Partition encoding chromosomes 
before cross-over 
Chromosome C1 
G1  G2  G3  G4  G5 
2  2  2  1  2 
Chromosome C2 
G1  G2  G3  G4  G5 
1  1  2  2  1 
 
Table 5. Partition encoding chromosomes af-
ter cross-over at position G3 
Chromosome C1’ 
G1  G2  G3  G4  G5 
2  2  2  2  1 
Chromosome C2’ 
G1  G2  G3  G4  G5 
1  1  2  1  2 
 
As shown in Table 4, the initial chromosome 
C1 encodes the partitions P1C1 = { A4} and 
P2C1 = {A1, A2, A3, A5}. The initial chromo-
some C2 encodes the partitions P1C2 = {A1, 
A2, A5} and P2C2={A3, A4}. Following the 
cross-over at position G3, new individuals - 
chromosomes  C1’  and  C2’  are  obtained. 
Chromosome  C1’  encodes  the  partitions 
P1C1’={ A5 } and P2C1’=  {A1, A2, A3, A4}. 
Chromosome C2’ encodes the partitions P1C2’ 
= {A3, A5 }. As seen the new individuals dif-
fer from their parents and therefore the dif-
ferent evaluations of these new chromosomes 
will bring improvement by creating better in-
dividuals. 
Table 6 shows the effect of applying muta-
tion operation on a chromosome. 
 
Table 6. Mutation at position G1 in the 
chromosome 
Chromosome C1 
G1  G2  G3  G4  G5 
2  2  2  1  2 
Chromosome C1’ 
G1  G2  G3  G4  G5 
1  2  2  1  2 
 
By randomly changing genes inside chromo-
somes, variability is introduced leading to the 
creation of new individuals. Chromosome C1 
encodes the partitions P1C1 = {A4} and P2C1 
= {A1, A2, A3, A5}. After mutation, the new 
chromosome C1’ encodes the partitions P1C1’ 
= {A1,A4} and P2C1’ = {A2, A3, A5}. 
Starting with an initial population of chromo-
somes,  randomly  generated,  genetic  opera-
tions are applied in order to obtain new gen-
erations  of chromosomes.  After a threshold 
number of iterations the best fit individual is 
chosen with respect to the evaluation func-
tion.  The  partitioning  encoded  by  the  best 
chromosome is used to separate attributes in-
to disjoint sets. 
Once the partitioning problem is solved, an 
attacker that gains access to a certain parti-
tion is unable to estimate sufficiently well a 
protected attribute As in the absence of other 
attributes  from  other  partitions.  There  re-
mains only to add another layer of protection 
by anonymizing the data stored at partition 
level. This means that a certain record in the 
partition is identified by an identification at-
tribute used to put in correspondence the rec-
ord with the real entity that is characterized 
by the attributes stored at partition level. For 
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the  row  of  data  regarding  stored  attributes; 
also it belongs to a real person; the identifica-
tion attribute needs to be used by the Busi-
ness Intelligence system to retrieve and ana-
lyze  data  regarding  a  certain  subscriber.  If 
the attacker gains access to a partition and re-
trieves  a  row  of  data  identified  by  a 
MSISDN,  automatically  the  attacker  gains 
access  to  information  regarding  the  person 
that owns the MSISDN. 
The proposed solution takes into account that 
there  is  a  central  node  of  Business  Intelli-
gence functionality where it is safe to use the 
identification  attribute.  Further  than  this 
point, at storage level layer, the identifier is 
considered as a secret and shared across par-
titions.
 
 
Fig. 2. BI interface integrated with client applications and using partitioned data 
 
In the following, we will consider a common 
use case for the deployment of the Business 
Intelligence  Solution.  Taking  into  account 
the components presented in Fig.  we discuss 
the case when the BI solution is deployed at a 
mobile  operator  type  organization.  The  BI 
solution integrates with specific applications 
such as CRM or low level applications such 
as Customer Care or Self Care. These appli-
cations make use of the functionality provid-
ed by the BI layer. For example, an operator 
uses the Customer Care application to provi-
sion some bonuses for a certain user identi-
fied by a MSISDN. The application is devel-
oped such way to display to the operator in-
formation regarding the risk of becoming a 
churner. If the user is at risk then the operator 
will provision a bonus to stimulate the user to 
continue  to  use  the  mobile  operator’s  ser-
vices. 
However,  this  action  implies  that  the  Cus-
tomer Care application calls the Business In-
telligence layer via a web service or other re-
quest/response protocol in order to obtain the 
risk measure. Also, the Customer Care appli-
cation provides in  the call the MSISDN of 
the user to retrieve information for. We con-
sider that all the information about the user, 
information that is derived using the present-
ed methods is part of a dataset stored sepa-
rately. The matching between the requested 
information and the user is represented by the 
MSISDN. In order to prevent reverse match-
ing and further association between the id of 
the data row and the user and also in order to 
prevent easy estimation of other attributes of 
the user based on the recorded ones, the da-
taset is partitioned into NP partitions. Since 
the MSISDN is used in clear inside the BI 
platform and inside the ecosystem of mobile 
CRM 
BI 
Interface 
Storage 
Access 
Partition 1 
AP1=Ai1, …, Aik1 
Partition NP 
APNP=Al1, …, Alk1 
Partition 2 
AP2=Aj1, …, Ajk1 
Modelbase 
Models 
Self 
Care 
Customer 
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operator’s applications, on the storage layer, 
it is needed to have this value altered such 
way an attacker gaining access to a certain 
partition is unable to put in correspondence 
the  id  of  a  certain  row  of  data  with  the 
MSISDN  of  the  user  of  mobile  operator’s 
services. The solution for this problem is us-
ing a secret sharing scheme. We propose us-
ing Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, as pre-
sented in [12]. We consider that the MSISDN 
is the secret to be hidden by sharing. An ini-
tial solution would be that in each partition, 
in each row, the MSISDN as identifier of the 
row is replaced by its part of the secret that 
corresponds  to  the  partition,  via  Samir’s 
transformation. However this does not cover 
all the security needs. If an attacker is inter-
ested  in  obtaining  information  regarding  a 
certain  MSISDN  then  he  could  easily  use 
Samir’s scheme to generate partitions of the 
secret which later are used to retrieve exact 
row from the partition. This issue is further 
addressed by the fact that the Storage Access 
layer  does  not  need  to  know  exactly  the 
MSISDN  but  it  can  use  any  mapping  or 
transformation  given  by  the  BI  layer  and 
known only by the BI layer which is consid-
ered trusted. The BI layer stores a secret key, 
K,  which  is  used  to  encrypt  the  MSISDN. 
The  encrypted  message  is  then  sent  to  the 
Storage layer which applies Shamir’s scheme 
to  obtain  the  identifiers  for  the  user’s  data 
stored across the partitions. Storage Access 
layer  becomes  unaware  of  any  relation  be-
tween the real MSISDN and the received en-
crypted  MSISDN,  while  at  partition  level 
each row id is even more displaced from the 
initial MSISDN and the real user identity it 
refers to. 
In Fig.  the sequence diagram shows the in-
teractions between presented components in 
order to produce the desired result for the ap-
plication’s operator. 
The operator accesses the page that request 
displaying  of  extra  information  regarding  a 
certain subscriber identified by a MSISDN. 
Beside other information, the client applica-
tion invokes a function on the Business Intel-
ligence layer to obtain the churn risk associ-
ated to the user. In order to hide the sensitive 
value of MSISDN, the BI layer first encrypts 
the MSISDN using the secret key K, obtain-
ing the encoded ENC_MSISDN. The BI lay-
er has to retrieve the values for all attributes 
stored in the derived dataset in order to feed 
these values to a model and get a result.  
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Fig. 3. Sequence diagram of the calls to securely retrieve user information 
 
Therefore, BI layer calls Storage Access lay-
er  functionality  to  get  data  regarding  the 
ENC_MSISDN  identifier.  The  Storage  Ac-
cess layer has to query NP partitions of data. 
Each partition has the record regarding our 
user identified by a part of ENC_MSISDN. 
The Storage Access layer computes the list of 
identifiers,  ID,  using  Shamir’s  scheme.  For 
each partition that is managed by the Storage 
layer, a row with the data corresponding to a 
subset of attributes is retrieved based on the 
computed ID and data is returned to the Stor-
age layer management component. Data re-
turned from each partition is a row regarding 
a subset of attributes for the subject subscrib-
er, and for partition i it is denoted APi. When 
data from all partitions have been retrieved, 
all the attributes are available regarding the 
user. Reunion of AP1, AP2, …, APNP is done 
by the Storage layer and itis exactly the list 
of values for the attributes A1, A2, …, An. 
Still at the level of Storage, no indication ex-
ists regarding the real user. The data is re-
turned to the Business Intelligence layer. The 
BI layer then triggers modelbase functionali-
ty feeding the data to an estimation model in 
order  to  obtain  an  estimation  of  the  churn 
risk. The obtained value is later passed in re-
sponse to the client application to be included 
in the displayed report.  
It is shown by the flow from Fig.  and adja-
cent  description  that  security  is  assured  at 
different levels: by anonymizing partitioned 
data using secret sharing and also protecting 
attributes  from  being  easily  estimated  by 
powerful data mining attacks. 
 
3 Case Study 
In the following we test our proposed solu-
tions using a dataset. For comparison purpos-
es the dataset is the same used in [10] and 
[11]. The dataset consists of a total of 18 at-
tributes of which 4 are attributes from an ini-
tial dataset and the rest are obtained using the 
various improvement methods presented. The 
dataset  includes  10694  rows  and  addresses 
churn prediction. 
The  considered  attributes  are  regarding  the 
usage of the service: 
  usageX – amount of service consumed – 
number of calls – during week X 
  diffwXwY – difference in usage between 
week X and week Y 166      Informatica Economică vol. 17, no. 3/2013 
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  rusgwX – relative usage in week X with 
respect to base week 
  ardiffwXwY – absolute difference in rel-
ative usage between weeks X and Y 
  pdiff – difference between week X and 
Y in percent 
  state – detected state of the user – active 
or  inactive  indicating  churning  or  not 
churning  
As a step in the partitioning algorithm, de-
pendency matrix for all attributes is comput-
ed as shown in Table 7 where attribute names 
are replaced with their index in the dataset. 
Based on the nature of the attributes, it is de-
cided which one is considered private. In the 
following we will consider that state attribute 
is  to  be  protected.  The  hypothesis  is  made 
that  there  exists  a  model  in  the  modelbase 
that takes all 17 factor attributes and is able 
to  output  an  estimation  of  state  attribute. 
State attribute is not intended to be stored in 
the dataset due to the fact that the model used 
for estimation had been fed with training data 
containing  state,  during  training  phase.  All 
the subsequent estimations use the model un-
til the next revision of the system including 
re-estimation of used models is done. 
Using attribute selection algorithms, the de-
pendency list for state attribute is obtained:  
state  <-  {usagew1,  usagew2,  usagew3,  us-
agew4, diffw4w3, rusgw1, rusgw2, rusgw3, 
rusgw4,  ardiffw2w1,  pdiffw3w1, 
pdiffw4w1}. 
The  remaining  attributes  are  {diffw2w1, 
diffw3w2,  ardiffw3w2,  ardiffw4w3, 
pdiffw2w1}. 
Using the whole training set, the quality of 
the estimation is given by the indicator that 
shows that 85.12% of the instances are cor-
rectly classified. 
If  partitioning  is  done  into  two  partitions, 
each partition contains half of the dependen-
cy attributes and half of the rest of the attrib-
utes; since the attributes are related we will 
select them using a step of two.  
 
Table 7. Dependency matrix between dataset attributes 
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The partitions are:    P1  =  {usagew1,  usagew3,  diffw4w3, 
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  P2  =  {  usagew2,  usagew4,  rusgw1,  ar-
diffw2w1,  pdiffw4w1,  diffw3w2,  ar-
diffw4w3}. 
 
Table 8. Partition evaluation 
Partition 
Evaluation 
(% of correctly esti-
mated instances) 
P1  66.93% 
P2  58.56% 
P1+P2 = full data  85.75% 
The  evaluation  of  the  ability  of  attributes 
from individual partitions to estimate the pro-
tected attribute state is presented in Table 8. 
As  seen  in  Table  8  partitioning  reaches  its 
objective to prevent the ability to estimate a 
protected attribute if only a partition is avail-
able to an attacker. The quality of the estima-
tions obtained only attributes from a certain 
partition is less than a threshold of 72% as 
indicator  of  usable  estimations.  In  contrast, 
the whole dataset is able to give an accuracy 
of 86% which is considered excellent given 
the conditions of the analysis. 
In order to ensure the anonymity of the data, 
the  secret  sharing  scheme  is  applied  at  the 
provisioning of the data. 
 
Table 9. Identifier splitting and reconstruction 
Partitioning 
Partition P1  Partition P2 
ID  AP1   ID  AP2 
…  …  …  … 
46e32f3cc6e735  …  d49c0125d8983f  … 
…  …  …  … 
Reconstruction  
ID  A1, …, An = AP1+AP2 
7654321  … 
Given the Shamir secret sharing scheme for 2 
partitions  with  a  threshold  of  2,  given  the 
identifier MSISDN=1234567, considering its 
encrypted form is ENC_MSISDN=7654321, 
then the sharing of ENC_MSISDN across the 
two partitions P1 and P2 is presented in Ta-
ble  9  as  well  as  the  reconstruction  of  the 
identifier at Storage Access layer level. 
As seen in Table 9 the records are imperson-
ated. At partition level, the identifier of the 
row is only a share of the secret that is unable 
to reconstruct the secret. At Storage Access 
level, the secret is known but as the Storage 
Access does not know the key that generated 
the  secret,  the  original  identifier  cannot  be 
deducted. 
 
5 Conclusions 
The research in the series regarding decora-
tion  of  datasets  having  little  data  available 
regarding the object of the analysis, with the 
purpose  of  improving  data  mining  analysis 
has  shown  that  an  enlarged  dataset  is  ob-
tained that greatly improves the quality of the 
estimations done via regression or classifica-
tion. Common applications used by large or-
ganizations need such results to help the de-
cision making process and help the organiza-
tion better understand its customers. Howev-
er, it was shown that data mining  methods 
are  powerful  enough  to  estimate  or  predict 
sensitive  or  private  attributes  based  on  the 
publicly  available  data.  This  constitutes  a 
privacy  issue  that  needs  to  be  addressed. 
With  regard  to  the  proposed  dataset  im-
provement methods, we have shown that par-
titioning of datasets is a solution to prevent 
such attacks.  The partitioning  of data takes 
into account that a partition stores a subset of 
the attributes used to predict a sensitive at-
tribute  and  an  attacker  gaining  access  to  a 
certain partition is unable to estimate the sen-
sitive attribute to a significant extent. Beside 
the data mining approach to the problem we 
addressed the anonymity of stored data, pro-
posing a scheme to detach identification in-
formation from partitions from the actual en-
tity that is subject to the analysis. 
Since Business Intelligence solutions become 
more  and  more  powerful  and  more  data  is 
available, such aspects presented in the paper 
must be taken into account accordingly. 168      Informatica Economică vol. 17, no. 3/2013 
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